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§ 9:9 Authenticating email, social media, web pages,
text messages, instant messaging, electronic
signatures
In the electronic communication era, email and web pages and
social media, not to mention twitter and texting and Instant Messaging, have become increasingly important types of evidence.1
Yet electronic evidence, because of the ease with which it can be
created, altered, and manipulated, presents challenging issues of
authentication.2
Email, text messages, instant messaging. Material of this sort is
1

D.C. Circuit: U.S. v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2006) (referring to our
“age of technology and computer use” in which email is a “normal and frequent”
mechanism for the majority of us, including “the professional world”).
2

See Jerry E. Smith, Email Evidence in the Age of Instant Communication:
A View from the Bench, Address at ALI-ABA CLE Seminar on Evidence Issues

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2540102

often proved by computer printout or electronic images. The evidentiary hurdles are minimal with respect to authenticating
printouts as accurate copies. A witness who has seen the email or
text message or instant message need only testify that a printout
offered is an accurate reproduction.3 With printouts, and also
with electronic images, the proponent can show the manner in
which a computer makes the image or gathers the data and sends
those data to a printer: Rule 901(b)(9) allows this form of
authentication, authorizing a showing that a process “produces
an accurate result.”4 A court may even take judicial notice of
these processes. There is no Best Evidence problem with respect
to printouts or electronic images, because Rule 1001(d) defines
“original” to include “any printout—or other output readable by
sight—if it accurately reflects the information.”5
Authenticating the email itself, or a text message or instant
message, can also be simple, depending on the purpose for which
it is offered. A witness can authenticate such material as having
and Jury Instructions in Employment Cases (Feb. 10, 2005) (commenting that
it is “easier to forge email than to forge hard copies,” by access to “an unlocked
computer or a carelessly placed Blackberry”); Jay M. Zitter, Authentication of
Electronically Stored Evidence, Including Text Messages and Email, 34 A.L.R.
6th 253 (2008).
Fourth Circuit: But see Lorraine v. Markel American Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D.
534, 543 (D. Md. 2007) (rejecting argument that emails or text messages are
unreliable because of “relative anonymity” and fact that message “can rarely be
connected to a specific author” with certainty; similar uncertainties exist with
written documents).
Pennsylvania: But see In re F.P., 878 A.2d 91, 95 (Pa. Super. 2005) (rejecting contention that emails and other electronic communications are “inherently
unreliable” and noting that “the same uncertainties” with written documents).
3
Tenth Circuit: U.S. v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241, 1249–1250 (10th Cir.
1998) (admitting printout of alleged chat room discussion between defendant
and undercover police officer based on evidence it was what government
claimed).
Mississippi: Kearley v. State, 843 So. 2d 66, 70 (Miss. App. 2002) (witness
vouched for accuracy of email printouts, thus authenticating them).
4
See discussion of Rule 901(b)(9) in § 9:20, infra.
Tenth Circuit: U.S. v. Meienberg, 263 F.3d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir. 2001)
(questions on accuracy of printouts, “whether resulting from incorrect data
entry or the operation of the computer program,” would affect weight, not
admissibility).
Washington: State v. Andrews, 293 P.3d 1203 (Wash. App. 2013) (admitting photograph of text message as duplicate admissible under Rule 1003).
5
See discussion of Rule 1001(3) in § 10:9, infra.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2540102

been sent by the witness himself by identifying it as such.6
Similarly, one who receives an email, text message, or instant
message, can authenticate it as having been received simply by
so testifying, but of course it is another matter to prove the
identity of the author of such an email, text or instant message.7
Testimony by the recipient indicating receipt of such material
satisfies Rule 901(b)(1) because it is testimony by a witness with
knowledge “that an item is what it is claimed to be,” namely an
email (or text or instant message) that the witness received.8 As
indicated below, often the recipient can provide additional
testimony that proves not only receipt of a particular email or
text or instant message, but the source as well.
Particularly in civil litigation, the authenticity of such material
can be established in pretrial discovery, including identification
at a deposition, in an answer to an interrogatory, or in response
to a request for admission. These mechanisms can often establish
not only receipt of such material, but authorship, and these matters are sometimes accomplished in pretrial settings by informal
means, even inadvertently, paving the way to admit the material
at trial (or sometimes simply making the task of authentication
easier by paving the way for a witness to testify that the matter
was conceded).9
The more difficult challenge is to establish authorship of emails,
and of text messages and instant messages, where the purported
author is unavailable or unable or unwilling to acknowledge the
6

Seventh Circuit: Fenje v. Feld, 301 F. Supp. 2d 781, 809 (N.D. Ill. 2003),
aff'd, 398 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2005) (can authenticate emails by “statements or
other communications” from purported author “acknowledging” them).
Mississippi: Kearley v. State, 843 So. 2d 66, 70 (Miss. App. 2002)
(defendant admitted to sending emails).
7
Seventh Circuit B.S. ex rel. Schneider v. Board of School Trustees, 255 F.
Supp. 2d 891, 893–894 (N.D. Ind. 2003) (affidavit of recipient is “acceptable
method” of authentication).
Mississippi: Kearley v. State, 843 So. 2d 66 (Miss. App. 2002) (in sexual
battery trial, minor victim could authenticate emails from defendant).
Texas: Shea v. State, 167 S.W.3d 98, 105 (Tex. App. 2005) (testimony of
complainant that she received the emails).
8
See discussion of Rule 901(b) in § 9:3, supra.
See generally Note, “God Mail”: Authentication and Admissibility of
Electronic Mail in Federal Courts, 34 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1387 (1997).
9
Fifth Circuit: Middlebrook v. Anderson, 2005 WL 350578 (N.D. Tex. 2005)
(statements in defendant's affidavit that he “did not intend” email messages to
be viewed in a particular state was a concession that he sent them).
Seventh Circuit: Superhighway Consulting, Inc. v. Techwave, Inc., 1999
WL 1044870 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (production of email during discovery from party
files justifies finding of authenticity).

point. Here the proponent must rely on other methods. Certainly
testimony by a person who saw the purported author write and
send such material would suffice. If the computer, or for that
matter the cellphone or “android” from which such material was
sent is owned by a particular person, was seized from that
person's possession, or there are other compelling circumstances
linking the computer to that person, such facts may be enough to
authenticate the material as having come from that person.10 If it
is a shared computer, or one to which others had access, additional evidence linking the purported author to the email seems
essential. For example, proof that the person in question was the
one using the computer when the message was sent should suffice to connect the message to that person. Particularly in criminal cases where establishing authorship, and where a jury may
have to be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was the author in order to convict him, prosecutors
sometimes call technical witnesses who do a trace. For emails, an
expert may rely on the coded Internet Protocol Address appearing in the email header and trace it back to the service provider
who relayed the message and sometimes back to a particular
computer,11 and electronic data can sometimes be authenticated
by reference to metadata stored in documents and by “hashtags”
used to encrypt data, and specifically by SHA (“secure hash
algorithm”) or the MD5 algorithm.12
If the email message was encrypted by means of a digital
signature and was therefore only available to a receiver who had
a private key or access to a public key, a technical expert should
be called to explain the encryption process and establish the necessary linkages to authenticate the email.13
The most common method of authenticating emails, text mes10

Fifth Circuit: U.S. v. Luncy, 676 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2012) (alleged attempt
at sex with underage girl; defendant was “on the phone talking with [alleged
victim] when he was arrested is enough” to prove his authorship of text
messages).
11
Ninth Circuit: Clement v. California Dept. of Corrections, 220 F. Supp. 2d
1098, 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002), aff'd, 364 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2004) (major email
providers include coded Internet Protocol address or IP address in email header;
IP address lets recipient “identify the sender by contacting the service provider”).
12
Fourth Circuit: Lorraine v. Markel American Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 34, 543
(D. Md. 2007) (citing use of “hash values” as a means of authenticating electronic
evidence, as well as metadata).
13
See generally Effross, Notes on PKI and Digital Negotiability: Would the
Cybercourrier Carry Luggage?, 38 Jurimetrics J. 385 (Spring 1998); Froomkin,
Flood Control on the Information Ocean: Living with Anonymity, Digital Cash
and Distributed Databases, 15 J. Law & Commerce 395, 411–24 (1996); Froom-

sages, and instant messages involves showing “appearance,
contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive
characteristics . . . , taken together with all the circumstances,”
which can suffice Rule 901(b)(4).14 Included in the relevant circumstances are indications in the message itself of its source
(whether name, phone number, or URL),15 connections between
statements in the communication itself and known facts about
the sender,16 behavior by the sender and the recipient that point
kin, Symposium: Innovation and the Information Environment: The Essential
Role of Trusted Third Parties in Electronic Commerce, 75 Or. L. Rev. 49 (1996).
14
North Dakota: State v. Thompson, 777 N.W.2d 617, 626 (N.D. 2010) (in
trial of wife for assaulting husband, admitting her text messages to him with
“profane and threatening language,” on circumstantial evidence that she wrote
them, including proof of her phone number and fact that her “distinctive
signature” showed on message; complainant testified that messages from her
appeared on his phone labeled “Fr: Jen,” which appears on messages) (citing
this Treatise).
Pennsylvania: In re F.P., 878 A.2d 91, 94–95 (Pa. Super. 2005) (distinguishing features in emails contributed to finding that they were authentic).
Texas: Massimo v. State, 144 S.W.3d 210, 215–216 (Tex. App. 2004)
(same).
Shea v. State, 167 S.W.3d 98, 105 (Tex. App. 2005) (same).
15
D.C. Circuit: U.S. v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2006) (emails
authenticated by distinctive characteristics, including actual email address
containing the “@” symbol, name of the person connected to that address, name
of senders and receiver in headers and bodies of email).
Seventh Circuit: Fenje v. Feld, 301 F. Supp. 2d 781, 810 (N.D. Ill. 2003),
aff'd, 398 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2005) (emails authenticated by testimony that
purported sender sent emails, source email address, matching that on purported
sender's letterhead, and content, which was consistent with other evidence).
Eleventh Circuit: U.S. v. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318, 1322–1323 (11th Cir.
2000) (fact that alleged sender's name and address appeared on email counts).
16
D.C. Circuit: U.S. v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2006) (emails
authenticated by distinctive characteristics, content discussing personal and
professional matters relating to individuals in question).
Tenth Circuit: U.S. v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241, 1250 (10th Cir. 1998)
(admitting instant messaging chat on basis that person using name “Stavron”
told officer his name was Simpson and gave street address; later exchanges
indicated email address belonging to Simpson; pages near computer in home
noted name, address, email address and phone number that officer gave in chat
room).
Arkansas: Todd v. State, 2012 WL 5424516 (Ark. App. 2012) (in trial for
internet stalking of child, admitting chat log; defendant “arrived at the agreed
store” at the “agreed date and time”).
North Carolina: State v. Wilkerson, 733 S.E.2d 181, 183–184 (N.C. App.
2012) (in robbery trial, admitting message sent from defendant's cellphone and
stored there referencing some of the stolen property found in his trunk).

toward the two as being sender and recipient,17 a course of
conduct or dealing between two people that regularly employs
emails, texts, or instant messages and showing that the material
in question fits into that course of dealing,18 and connections between the person in question and the phone in question, coupled
with other information about behavior as it relates to content.19
The fact that a person's name appears in the header as the
“sender” should not be enough to authenticate the email as being
from that person, just as self-identification by a telephone caller
is insufficient to authenticate the call as being from that person.20
However, self-identification can complement other authenticating
factors such as circumstances, content, internal patterns and
extrinsic evidence.21
Stronger circumstantial evidence would be a showing that the
actual email address, e.g., mailto:johndoe@aol.com, matches an
account in that person's name with the indicated internet service
provider, although this is not necessarily sufficient by itself
because it is not technically difficult to send an email message
using another's email address.
In most modern cases, courts have relied primarily on the
content of the message as a basis for authenticating emails.22 If
an email contains particularized information that only the
purported sender is likely to know, this will authenticate the
17

New York: People v. Green, 2013 WL 3029447 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (in
trial for rape and related offenses, admitting text messages from defendant to
complainant, since content made no sense unless they were sent by him).
18
Ohio: State v. Huge, 2013 WL 2325637 (Ohio App. 2013) (in trial of father
for killing his infant daughter, admitting text messages to victim's mother on
basis of her testimony that “texting was her normal means of communicating
with” him, and that message had been sent by him and “saved to her phone”).
19
Florida: Symonette v. State, 100 So.3d 180 (Fla. App. 2012) (in robbery
trial, admitting text messages apparently sent by defendant to driver of getaway
car and by her to him; driver identified messages and context; they were also
found on defendant's phone, retrieved on his arrest).
20
See § 9:16, supra.
Third Circuit: Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 236 (3d Cir. 2007)
(error to take judicial notice of facts about plaintiff company based on website,
which was not authenticated; anyone may purchase web address, so trade name
in URL does not authenticate website; can only notice matters not subject to
reasonable dispute).
21
See generally B.S. ex rel. Schneider v. Board of School Trustees, 255 F.
Supp. 2d 891, 893–894 (N.D. Ind. 2003); Kearley v. State, 843 So. 2d 66 (Miss..
App. 2002); Shea v. State, 167 S.W.3d 98, 105 (Tex. App. 2005)
22
D.C. Circuit: U.S. v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2006) (emails
authenticated in part by content disclosing personal and professional matters
relating to individuals in question).

email to the same extent that such knowledge would authenticate
a written message.23 Obviously the more specialized or unique
the information, the more such content tends to authenticate the
message as being from a particular sender who has such
knowledge.
Particularized content may include information about serial
numbers, credit card numbers, ordering information, personal
transactions, private communications, particular relationships,
coded communications, and other types of private information, or
at least information that is not known to the general public.24
A common type of content used to authenticate is content given
in reply to an earlier email message.25 An email purporting to be
a reply to an earlier message sent to a particular person is likely
to be authored by that person. Often an email message will
include the message to which it is responding as an attachment
or even in the body of the message. Even though it is possible
that a reply is sent by a person other than the recipient of the
original message, the danger is no greater here than for written
messages.
Other circumstances that can be used to help authenticate an
email include the fact that the purported sender promised to
send an email to the recipient and one was later received, the
fact that previous messages sent to a particular email address
See generally B.S. ex rel. Schneider v. Board of School Trustees, 255 F.
Supp. 2d 891, 893–894 (N.D. Ind. 2003); Kearley v. State, 843 So. 2d 66 (Miss.
App. 2002); Shea v. State, 167 S.W.3d 98, 105 (Tex. App. 2005)
See also Note, When the Postman Beeps Twice: The Admissibility of
Electronic Mail Under the Business Records Exception to the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 2285 (1996).
23
See §§ 9:6 to 9:9, supra.
24
Eleventh Circuit: U.S. v. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 2000)
(in trial for submitting fraudulent recommendations for National Science
Foundation award, admitting emails from defendant; they showed knowledge of
actions only he would have, apologized for things he had done, came from his
email address, were signed with his nickname, and he made similar points in
conversations thereafter).
25
Fifth Circuit: U.S. v. Barlow, 568 F.3d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 2009) (in trial
for seeking sex with underage female, admitting chatroom log on testimony by
freelance undercover agent posing as girl, indicating that transcripts “fairly and
fully reproduced” chats between her, posing as Rebecca, and defendant; agent
was the other participant in year-long “relationship’ ’’ and had direct knowledge
of chats and could authenticate chat log).
Virginia: See Bloom v. Com., 542 S.E.2d 18, 20–21 (Va. App. 2001), aff'd,
554 S.E.2d 84 (Va. 2001) (“internal links” between earlier and later internet
communications between defendant and victim authenticity).
See discussion of the “reply doctrine” in § 9:7, supra.

reached the purported sender of the email in question,26 or the
fact that actions were taken by the purported sender in response
to emails sent to the purported sender's address,27 such as the
shipping of merchandise. Many other circumstances count as
well.28
Emails can also be authenticated under Rule 901(b)(3), which
authorizes “comparison with an authenticated specimen by an
expert witness or the trier of fact.” Thus emails that are not
clearly identifiable on their own can be authenticated by allowing
the jury to compare them with specimens that have been previously authenticated.29 Even if an email is successfully authenticated, it is not admissible to prove the truth of its content unless
an additional foundation is laid showing that it fits an exception
to the hearsay rule. If the email is shown to be from a party opponent, this will ordinarily suffice to allow its introduction into
evidence as an admission.30 An email forwarding another email
may sometimes constitute an adoptive admission of the original
email by the person forwarding it.31 In unusual circumstances, an
email statement may qualify as a present sense impression or an
excited utterance.32
Emails, even if made in the course of business, do not necessar26

Eleventh Circuit: U.S. v. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318, 1322–1323 (11th Cir.
2000) (alleged sender had previously received email at that address).
27
Eleventh Circuit: U.S. v. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318, 1322–1323 (11th Cir.
2000) (in later phone call, alleged sender repeated request that appeared in
email).
28
Tenth Circuit: U.S. v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241, 1249–1250 (10th Cir.
1998) (admitting printout of chat room discussion between defendant and
undercover officer on proof that person calling himself “Stavron” gave officer his
name as Simpson and his street address; later exchanges indicated email address belonging to him; pages found near computer in his home contained notation of name, street address, email address and phone number that officer gave
in chat room).
29
D.C. Circuit: U.S. v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2006) (can
authenticate emails by comparing them with other emails that had been
authenticated by content and distinctive characteristics).
30
Ninth Circuit: Van Westrienen v. Americontinental Collection Corp., 94
F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1109 (D. Or. 2000) (representations made by defendants on
website are admissions of party-opponent).
31
Ninth Circuit: Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Lozen Intern., LLC., 285 F.3d
808, 821 (9th Cir. 2002) (employee of plaintiff “incorporated and adopted the
contents” of an email message from another of plaintiff's employees when she
forwarded it to defendant with a cover note that “manifested an adoption or
belief in the truth” of information contained in original email).
32
First Circuit: U.S. v. Ferber, 966 F. Supp. 90 (D. Mass. 1997) (admitting
email as present sense impression).

ily qualify for admission as business records.33 While emailed billing statements and similar records may qualify, routine personal
and professional email communications, like routine written correspondence, often fail to satisfy the exception because they lack
the regularity and systematic checking of information that justifies making business records an exception to the hearsay rule.34
The procedures for authenticating printouts of online conversations in internet “chat rooms” are essentially the same as those
for authenticating emails.35
Oregon: State v. Cunningham, 40 P.3d 1065, 1076 n8 (Or. App. 2002),
rev'd on other grounds, 99 P.3d 271 (Or. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 931 (2005)
(noting that email may be admissible as excited utterance).
33
For a discussion of the application of the business records exception to
email, see Note, When the Postman Beeps Twice: The Admissibility of Electronic
Mail Under the Business Records Exception of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
64 Fordham L. Rev. 2285 (1996).
34
First Circuit: U.S. v. Ferber, 966 F. Supp. 90, 98 (D. Mass. 1997) (it may
have been employee's routine practice to make email records; there was not
enough evidence that employer required such records; business records exception requires business duty to make and maintain records).
Ninth Circuit: Monotype Corp. PLC v. International Typeface Corp., 43
F.3d 443, 450 (9th Cir. 1994) (electronic documents may fit business records
exception, but email is “far less of a systematic business activity than a monthly
inventory printout” and is instead “an ongoing electronic message and retrieval
system”).
35
Fifth Circuit: U.S. v. Barlow, 568 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2009) (transcripts of
“chat log” of conversations between agent and defendant authenticated by
agent's testimony that they were accurate).
Ninth Circuit: U.S. v. Tank, 200 F.3d 627, 629–631 (9th Cir. 2000) (in T's
trial for sexual exploitation, from transactions in Internet chat room called the
Orchid Club, where members trade digital child porn, admitting logs kept on
R's computer; R was a club member and he deleted “nonsexual conversations
and extraneous material, such as date and time stamps,” but remainder of logs
implicated T; reviewing court rejects claim that changes might have introduced
“undetectable material alterations,” since R explained how he created logs, and
they “appeared to be an accurate representation” of conversations; government
connected logs with T by showing he used screen name “Cessna” which appeared in printouts of logs).
Tenth Circuit: U.S. v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241, 1249–50 (10th Cir. 1998)
(chat room logs sufficiently authenticated).
See J. Allan Cobb, Evidentiary Issues Concerning Online “Sting” Operations: A Hypothetical-Based Analysis Regarding Authentication, Identification,
and Admissibility of Online Conversations—A Novel Test for the Application of
Old Rules to New Crimes, 39 Brandeis L. J. 785, 805–820, 823–834 (2001).
Eleventh Circuit: U.S. v. Lanzon, 639 F.3d 1293, 1301 (11th Cir. 2011) (in
sex offense trial, admitting instant message transcripts where detective testified
that he participated in online chats and transcripts were accurate).

Web pages. It was only a matter of time before courts were
asked to consider the matter of authenticating internet web pages
(or websites) and web postings. Clearly such material is subject
to the authentication requirement, and authenticating such material can be a matter of some difficulty. Particularly in the case
of private websites, authenticating proof is necessary,36 although
government websites appear to be self-authenticating under Rule
902(5) as a publication “purporting to be issued by a public
authority.”37
Just as a phone call can sometimes be authenticated by proof
that the calling party “dialed” the number assigned by the phone
company to another, coupled usually with proof that the ensuing
conversation was the sort of conversation that would go forward
if the caller got the intended number, it is usually sufficient to
show that a web surfer looked up a particular person or company
in a directory or found it by using a search engine, and went to
that site and was able to place an order or conduct business that
would be expected at such a site. Although these questions are
just now beginning to appear, it is clear that authentication
should be required in this setting.38
Some of the early judicial opinions indicated extreme skepticism toward this form of evidence. One court described the
Internet as “one large catalyst for rumor, innuendo, and
misinformation” and suggested that there is a presumption that
information discovered on the Internet is “inherently
untrustworthy.”39 Other decisions have been more receptive and
approving. There is no reason why evidence from websites should
36

Fifth Circuit: Bibolotti v. American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc., 2013
WL 2147949 (E.D. Tex. 2013) (Internet websites are not self-authenticating; no
proof of authenticity here; striking proffered printouts from record).
Eighth Circuit: Fraserside IP LLC v. Netvertising Ltd., 902 F.Supp.2d
1165, 1179 n2 (N.D. Iowa 2012) (private websites are not self-authenticating;
must produce some statement or affidavit by person with knowledge).
37
Hawaii: Child Envorcement Agency v. MSH, 2013 WL 1829647 (the “.gov”
internet domain generally denotes a website administered by a government
entity, and as such it is self-authenticating under Rule 902(5)).
38
For a helpful discussion of authentication of website contents, see Joseph,
Modern Visual Evidence § 15.02[1] (2006).
Fifth Circuit: U.S. v. Baker, 538 F.3d 324, 331–333 (5th Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 962 (2009) (in trial for distributing child porn, error to admit
images uploaded to website; insufficient evidence that defendant uploaded them).
39
Fifth Circuit: St. Clair v. Johnn's Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F.Supp. 2d
773, 774–775 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (some look to Internet as innovative vehicle for
communication, but court “warily and wearily” views it as “catalyst for rumor,
innuendo, and misinformation,” which provides “no way of verifying the
authenticity” of contentions plaintiff wishes to use in response to defense mo-

not be admissible for certain purposes, provided it has been
adequately authenticated.
Website postings may have particular value when offered
against the owner of the website, for example, as an admission
by that party or for a nonhearsay purpose such as establishing
the price of a product, representations to induce a sale, the terms
of a contract, or a warranty.
To authenticate a printout of a web page, the proponent must
offer evidence that: (1) the printout accurately reflects the computer image of the web page as of a specified date; (2) the website
where the posting appears is owned or controlled by a particular
person or entity; and (3) the authorship of the web posting is reasonably attributable to that person or entity. Evidence that may
corroborate these points could include testimony of others who
saw the posting on the website, continuation of the posting on
the website so that it is available to be seen by the court, or evidence that the party to whom the posting is attributed made similar postings or published the same information elsewhere.40 Some
services take “snapshots” of websites as they appeared on particular dates and store that information in an archive. The
testimony of an expert familiar with how those services work
may be sufficient to authenticate an image purporting to depict
the appearance of a website on a date in question.41
tion; plaintiff cannot overcome “presumption” that information discovered on
Internet is “inherently untrustworthy,” as anybody can post “anything” there;
no website is monitored for accuracy, and nothing is under oath or subject to
verification; moreover, “hackers can adulterate” content on any website for
anywhere).
40
Ninth Circuit: Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d
1146, 1154 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (in copyright case, declarations that printouts were
“true and correct” copies of internet pages, “in combination with circumstantial
indicia of authenticity (such as the dates and web addresses)” would support
reasonable juror belief that documents are what proponent claims).
Ohio: See Johnson-Wooldridge v. Wooldridge, 2001 WL 838986, *4 (Ohio
App. 2001) (party who printed documents from a website “could have
authenticated the documents himself via an affidavit or through his own
testimony”).
41
See generally Eltgroth, Best Evidence and the Wayback Machine: Toward
a Workable Authentication Standard for Archived Internet Evidence, 78
Fordham L. Rev. 181 (2009).
Third Court: U.S. v. Bansal, 663 F.3d 634, 667 (3d Cir. 2011) (in drug
conspiracy case, admitting screenshots of defendant's online pharmacy operation where government obtained images from company that maintained
“Wayback Machine,” a historical database of all internet websites, and witness
testified about operation and reliability of company's operations, and stated that

If authorship or responsibility for the web posting cannot be
sufficiently established, exclusion will normally be required.42
If the web posting is offered for the truth of what it asserts, it
is necessary to lay an additional foundation to admit it under an
exception to the hearsay rule. A distinction must of course be
drawn between authenticating a web posting as being from a
particular person and offering it to prove the truth of any assertions it contains. In the case of admissions, these issues conflate.
If the web posting is adequately authenticated as being from a
party opponent, it normally will be admissible as an admission. If
the web posting is by a third party and is offered for its truth, an
additional foundation is necessary to admit it as an exception to
the hearsay rule.43
In the case of government-maintained websites, courts are
divided on whether information posted thereon is admissible to
screenshots were authentic based on comparison with previously authenticated
and admitted images from defendant's website).
Seventh Circuit: Telewizja Polska USA, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp.,
65 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 673 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (noting that while such archiving
technology does not fall within any of the examples listed in Rule 901, there
was no evidence that it was unreliable or biased; and holding that the affidavit
of an expert affiliated with an archiving company was sufficient to authenticate
an exhibit purporting to depict a website as of a particular date).
Eighth Circuit: Jones v. National American University, 608 F.3d 1039,
1045–46, 257 Ed. Law Rep. 866, 82 Rule Serv. 1236 (8th Cir. 2010) (online
employment advertisements authenticated by testimony from (a) university
president that he was familiar with employment section of university's website,
and that advertisements offered by plaintiff were in same format of web postings, and (b) university employees that they had seen advertisement for director
of admissions position) (authentication was sufficient even though posting differed in format from other advertisements and author was not identified).
42
Seventh Circuit: U.S. v. Jackson, 208 F.3d 633, 638 (7th Cir. 2000) (in
trial for defrauding UPS by suggesting that African-American artwork had been
damaged by white supremacist group when defendant did it, purported web
pages of white supremacist group taking credit were not authenticated;
defendant was savvy computer user and made no showing that pages were
posted by supremacist group rather than defendant herself).
Ninth Circuit: Costa v. Keppel Singmarine Dockyard PTE, Ltd., 2003 WL
24242419 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (excluding webpage describing defendant's corporate
structure; no showing that defendant directed placement of information on
website).
Wady v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co. of America, 216 F. Supp. 2d
1060, 1064–65 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (postings from defendant's website not
authenticated; proponent could not establish who maintained website or authorship or accuracy of contents).
43
Seventh Circuit: U.S. v. Jackson, 208 F.3d 633, 637 (7th Cir. 2000) (web
postings offered to prove matter asserted must satisfy hearsay exception).

prove the matter asserted, with some allowing44 and some rejecting such evidence.45 The resolution of this issue should depend on
the reasons for the existence of the government website. If its
purpose is to function as the equivalent of an official government
publication, properly authenticated web postings should be
admissible under Rule 902(5).46
Electronic signatures. Because so much commerce is now in
electronic form, Congress passed the Electronic Signatures in
Global and National Commerce Act (E-Sign) in 2000.47 The Act
provides that in transactions affecting interstate or foreign commerce “a signature, contract, or other record relating to such
transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form” and the contract
itself may not be denied legal effect “solely because an electronic
signature or electronic record was used in its formation.”48
The Act has broad effect in affirming the legal status of a wide
variety of records in electronic format, including business records, public records, and insurance documents.49 It authorizes
the retention of records in electronic form under a variety of
existing statutes that require record retention.50
The Act defines an electronic signature as “an electronic sound,
symbol, or process, attached to or logically associated with a
contract or other record and executed or adopted by a person
44

Second Circuit: Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.R.D.
116, 121 (S.D. N.Y. 2000) (prime rates published on Federal Reserve Board web
site satisfy Rule 803(17) as market reports).
45
Indiana: Dumes v. State, 718 N.E.2d 1171, 1178–1179 (Ind. App. 1999)
(motor vehicle department records obtained via internet not admissible).
Washington: State v. Davis, 10 P.3d 977, 1009–1010 (Wash. 2000)
(printout from state website on population statistics was not self-authenticating
official publication; did not satisfy public records exception).
46
Sannes v. Jeff Wyler Chevrolet, Inc., 1999 WL 33313134, n3 (S.D. Ohio
1999) (press release on FTCs website was self-authenticating official
publication).
47
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7001 to 7006. See generally, Wittie & Winn, Electronic
Records and Signatures Under the Federal E-SIGN Legislation and the UETA,
56 Bus. Law. 293 (2000); Note, The E-Sign Act of 2000: The Triumph of Function
over Form in American Contract Law, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1183 (2001);
Comment, E-Commerce and E-Law: Is Everything E-okay? Analysis of the
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 53 Baylor L. Rev.
803 (2001).
48
15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(a).
49
15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(i) (noting intent that statute apply to insurance).
50
15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(d).

with the intent to sign the record.”51 However, there is no specified procedure for authenticating such signatures in a court
proceeding, and other provisions of the Act give little guidance on
this point.52 The Act provides that where law requires a signature
under oath to be notarized, acknowledged, or otherwise made
under oath, that requirement is satisfied “if the electronic
signature of the person authorized to perform those acts, together
with all other information required to be included by other applicable statute, regulation, or rule of law, is attached to or logically associated with the signature or record.”53 However, the
electronic signature of the notary or person administering the
oath will also need to be authenticated.
Because there are so many potential forms of electronic
signature, the authentication methods must necessarily vary
with the type of signature used. Certainly a party can authenticate that party's own signature under Rule 901(b)(1), as can a
knowledgeable witness who observed the signing or has another
basis for recognizing the signature. Sometimes a signature can
be authenticated by the out-of-court admissions of the purported
signer and admitted under Rule 801(d)(2). It may be possible to
authenticate an electronic signature under Rule 901(b)(3) by having an expert witness or even the trier of fact compare it to a
specimen which has been authenticated.
In some cases, the signature can be authenticated by its “appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics . . . , taken together with all the circumstances” under Rule 901(b)(4). Electronic signature systems
sometimes use verification technologies that might fall within
this section. Much as with email authentication, electronic
signatures might be authenticated by particularized information
that only the purported signer is likely to know, in the form of a
verification password (e.g., a deceased pet's name or mother's
maiden name) that must be entered before the signature is
accepted. Similarly, some technologies may require that a user
provide personal information that can then be checked indepen51

15 U.S.C.A. § 7006(5).
The Secretary of Commerce is instructed to promote the use and acceptance of electronic signatures on an international basis in accordance with
principles that “[p]ermit parties to a transaction to determine the appropriate
authentication technologies and implementation models for their transactions,
with assurance that those technologies and implementation models will be
recognized and enforced” and to “[t]ake a nondiscriminatory approach to
electronic signatures and authentication methods from other jurisdictions.” 15
U.S.C.A. § 7031.
53
15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(g).
52

dently to confirm the signer's identity, such as credit card
information. Other technologies might employ an email to the
signer's email address that requires a response before the
signature is accepted; a reply from an email address known to be
used by the purported signer may be used to authenticate a
signature.
In some cases, the electronic signature may be a sound rather
than an image, and a tape of the sound may be used to demonstrate the digitally produced sound. A witness would then need
to identify the sound as one establishing the signature on the
document offered.
In many cases writings at issue in litigation that rely on
electronic signatures will be signed and sent using encryption
technology. In such cases a technical witness is necessary who
should be able to authenticate the signature by explaining the
process of cryptography and the specific procedures that were
used with respect to the electronic communication at issue.54
Social media. Modern cases have increasingly faced the question whether evidence from social media (Facebook, MySpace,
Twitter, and others) should be admitted. Authentication issues
resemble those found with other forms of electronic communication, but one distinguishing factor is that social media often
involve postings that are accessible to large numbers of people,
and sometimes to the entire world. It is uncertain whether social
media accounts are more easily hacked than email accounts, but
obvious concerns about security of social media arise, and it may
well be that more people have both motive and access to social
media, which heightens concerns over security and possibly malicious and fraudulent postings. The Maryland Supreme Court
observed that “authentication concerns attendant to emails,
instant messaging, and text messages differ significantly from
those involving a MySpace profile and posting printout, because
such correspondence is sent directly from one party to an
54

The process requires a public key and a private key. Each is a unique
mathematical algorithm maintained by a “certification authority,” who is a
neutral third party. The signer encrypts the message with a private key, sends
it to the recipient, who uses a public key to decode the message. If the document
is forged or altered, the keys will not function. Use of digital signature technology is specifically provided for by the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act,
which has been adopted by a number of states. See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 161602.
See generally, Froomkin, The Essential Role of Trusted Third Parties in
Electronic Commerce, 75 Or. L. Rev. 49 (1996).

intended recipient or recipients, rather than published for all to
see.”55
As with other forms of electronic communication, the challenge
is usually not in proving that a particular communication was
received or posted, and the concern is rather in learning the
identity of the sender or maker. A mere showing that the message was sent from a particular account or posted on a particular
web page is not necessarily sufficient to authenticate the message
as being from the owner of that account or web page,56 and more
should be shown to establish the identity of the person posting
the message, such as evidence that the originating site has security features that tend to assure the identity of the source.57
The authentication method most commonly used by proponents
of social media evidence is to demonstrate its distinctive
characteristics. Under Rule 902(4) the proponent must show that
the circumstantial evidence of the case combined with the “appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics” of the exhibit are sufficient to prove that the
proffered evidence is what it is purported to be. A distinctive
characteristic particularly likely to persuade a court that the
55

Maryland: Griffin v. Maryland, 19 A.3d 415, 426 n.13 (Md. 2011).
First Circuit: Massachusetts v. Williams, 926 N.E.2d 1162, 1172 (Mass.
2010) (while foundational testimony showed that the messages “were sent by
someone with access to [defendant's] MySpace Web page, it did not identify the
person who actually sent the communication”).
Second Circuit: Connecticut v. Eleck, 23 A.3d 818, 824–25 (Conn. App.
Ct. 2011) (witness claimed her Facebook account had been hacked, highlighting
“the general lack of security of the medium” and raising the question “whether
a third party may have sent the messages via [the witness's] account”),
Maryland: Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 421–422 (Md. 2011) (in homicide
trial, error to admit posting on MySpace site; it said “snitches get stitches,” and
was attributed to defendant's girlfriend; anyone can establish such a site; people
can set up fake accounts in the name of another, and possibility of fabrication or
tampering “poses significant challenge”) (reversing).
New York: State v. Lenihan, 911 N.Y.S.2d 588, 591–592 (N.Y. App. Div.
2010) (MySpace photographs downloaded by defendant's mother and offered to
impeach witnesses insufficiently authenticated, given ease of editing photos on
a computer).
57
First Circuit: Massachusetts v. Williams, 926 N.E.2d 1162, 1172 (Mass.
2010) (excluding MySpace messages allegedly from defendant; there was no
testimony on the security of such a Web Page, or “who can access a MySpace
Web page, whether codes are needed for such access,” and no expert testimony
indicated that only defendant could communicate from that page).
56

authentication requirement is satisfied is the use of code words
known only to the parties.58
Circumstantial evidence varies significantly from case to case,
and courts apply different levels of scrutiny when determining
whether the authentication threshold has been satisfied. Some
courts have applied a strict standard59 and others a more lenient
one.60
If the proponent calls an authenticating witness to testify how
a particular electronic communication is made, such as an expert
from the company sponsoring the social media site, that person
must be able to “provide factual specificity about the process by
which the electronically stored information is created, acquired,
maintained, and preserved without alteration or change, or the
process by which it is produced if the result of a system or process that does so.”61 Courts have held, however, that it is not es58

Sixth Circuit: Ohio v. Bell, 882 N.E. 2d 502, 512 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2008)
(MySpace messages contained code words known only to defendant and his alleged victims).
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Second Circuit: Connecticut v. Eleck, 23 A.3d 818, 824–25 (Conn. App.
Ct. 2011) (witness claimed her Facebook account had been hacked, which
highlights “the general lack of security of the medium and raises an issue as to
whether a third party may have sent the messages via [the witness's] account”),
New York: State v. Lenihan, 911 N.Y.S.2d 588, 591–592 (N.Y. App. Div.
2010) (MySpace photographs downloaded by defendant's mother and offered to
impeach witnesses were not authenticated, given ease of editing photos on a
computer).
60
Third Circuit: In re F.P., 878 A.2d 91, 95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (admitting
text messages; no need for heightened scrutiny for electronic evidence; “same
uncertainties” exist with traditional written documents as they do with
electronic evidence; “a signature can be forged; a letter can by typed on another's typewriter; distinct letterhead stationery can be copied or stolen”)
Sixth Circuit: Ohio v. Bell, 882 N.E.2d 502, 512 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2008)
(there is a possibility that evidence from a social media site could be incomplete,
altered or posted by a third party who hacked into the user's account, but those
issues “touch upon concerns regarding the weight of given evidence and not its
authenticity”).
Texas: Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633 (Tex. App. 2012) (in homicide
trial arising out of shootout, admitting MySpace pages in which defendant presented violent self-image, on basis of testimony describing the creation of
MySpace accounts, linking them to defendant through nicknames and
photographs and zipcodes and references to events).
61
Fourth Circuit: Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 545 (D.
Md. 2007).

62

Sixth Circuit: Dockery v. Dockery, 2009 WL 3486662 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009)
(calling “representative from MySpace was not a prerequisite” to admit- ting printouts
of exchanged messages).

